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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
cobcdo, the state must accept the responsibility for compensating ap-
pointed counsel, for the profession, in view of today's complex and
lengthy trials, cannot provide, by itself, adequate and efficient defenses
for the indigent without ruinous consequences.
Bruce Petesch
CRIMINAL LAW-PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT-
IMPROPER COMMENT VERSUS PREJUDICIAL
INFRINGEMENT
The defendant, John Woodards, was charged with the brutal slaying of
Margaret Van Arsdale, an eighty-five year old woman, and was convicted
of first degree murder. The Court of Appeals for Lorain County, and the
Ohio Supreme Court considered the alleged prejudicial statements in the
prosecutor's closing argument and held that while the remarks were in-
temperate, they were not prejudicial. State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14,
215 N.E.2d 568 (1966).
It is the purpose of this note to illustrate the wide latitude presently al-
lowed a prosecutor in the closing argument of a criminal case.' To do so,
this note will discuss the fundamental rules relating to improper argument
which were at issue in the Woodards case. It will then be possible to delve
into the considerations which determine whether or not a prejudicial in-
fringement necessitating reversal has occurred. The most significant of
these considerations are: whether or not the prosecutor's argument is sup-
ported by the evidence or is merely personal opinion; the strength of the
states evidence; the nature of the crime; and whether opposing counsel
made timely objection. The Woodards case is noteworthy since it demon-
strates how a court weighs these considerations where there has been an
infringement of the rules governing proper argument.
The first rule of significance deals with comment on the character and
reputation of the accused. Ordinarily, where the accused does not put his
character in issue by introducing evidence as to his good character, the
prosecutor cannot comment thereon.2 Secondly, it is improper to indulge
1 E.g., United States v. Mucherino, 311 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1962); State v. Dowthard,
92 Ariz. 44, 373 P.2d 357 (1962); People v. Weire, 198 Cal. App. 2d 138, 17 Cal. Rptr.
659 (1961); State v. Stacy, 355 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. 1962); State v. Christopher, 258 N.C.
249, 128 S.E.2d 667 (1962); Young v. State, 357 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1960); State v. Edge-
worth, 239 S.C. 10, 121 S.E.2d 248 (1961); State v. Burtts, 132 N.XW.2d 209 (S.D. 1964).
2 Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100, 78 S.E.2d 51 (1953); State v. Von Atzinger, 81
N.J.Super. 509, 196 A.2d 241 (1963); People v. Hentenyl, 304 N.Y. 80, 106 N.E.2d 20
(1952); State v. Roach, 248 N.C. 63, 102 S.E.2d 413 (1958); State v. Herrera, 236 Ore. 1,
386 P.2d 448 (1963); Clark v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 526, 244 S.W.2d 218 (1951); State
v. Lindsey, 185 Wash. 206, 52 P.2d 1246 (1936).
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in abusive language and intemperate characterization tending solely to
arouse or inflame the passions or prejudices of the jurors.- Although case
law has defined other general rules concerning improper comment by the
prosecutor,4 the above are the most basic. Both were at issue in the Wood-
ards case.
In the Woodards case, the prosecutor accused the defendant of faking
insanity,' and called him a misfit. 6 Such language represents an improper
characterization, since the defendant did not put his character or reputa-
tion in issue. Furthermore, the prosecutor called the defendant a parasite
on society, like a gangrenous leg on a diabetic body threatening the body
and society of the state.' This remark is violative of the second rule men-
tioned since it is abusive and tends to arouse and inflame the passions and
prejudices of the jurors.8 Upon review of the alleged error, the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that even though portions of the prosecutor's summation
were improper, they were not prejudicial in view of all of the accompany-
ing circumstances of the case.
a See Rogers v. State, 157 So.2d 13 (Ala. 1963); People v. Motherwell, 195 Cal. App.
2d 545, 16 Cal. Reptr. 140 (1961); Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1951); People v.
Mackey, 30 111. 2d 190, 195 N.E.2d 636 (1964); State v. Hubbard, 165 Kan. 406, 195 P.2d
604 (1948); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1957); Craft v. State, 226
Miss. 426, 84 So. 2d 531 (1956); State v. Harris, 351 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1961); State v.
Von Atzinger, 81 N.J.Super. 509, 196 A.2d 241 (1963); Reich v. State, 111 Tex. Crim.
642, 13 S.W.2d 697 (1929); Compton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 48, 55 S.E.2d 446
(1949).
A prosecutor can, however, comment on the evil results of crime. See Beck v. United
States, 33 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1949); People v. Kendall, 212 Cal. App. 2d 472, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 53 (1963); People v. Morgan, 28 I11. 2d 55, 190 N.E.2d 755 (1963); People v.
Hampton, 24 111. 2d 558, 182 N.E.2d 698 (1962); People v. Williams, 26 11. 2d 190, 186
N.E.2d 353 (1962); Workman v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 117, 216 S.W.2d 415 (1948);
State v. Sercovich, 246 La. 503, 165 So. 2d 301 (1964); State v. Jones, 384 S.W.2d 554
(,Mo. 1964); Muncy v. State, 330 S.¥V.2d 626 (Tex. 1959).
Prosecutor can also urge the jury to do its duty and urge a fearless administration of
the law. See Thompson v. United States, 272 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 362
U.S. 940 (1960); Sanders v. State, 37 Ala. App. 487, 70 So. 2d 802 (1954); Bryant v.
State, 208 Ark. 192, 185 S.W.2d 280 (1945); State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 337 P.2d 1
(1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 882 (1959), rehearing denied 361 U.S. 973 (1960); State v.
Jones, 358 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1962); State v. Wilson, 351 P.2d 944 (Ore. 1960); Strahan
v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 478, 358 S.W.2d 626 (1962).
4 Definite categories of improper comment by a prosecutor in his closing argument.
23A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1102-07 (1961, Supp. 1966).
5 State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966).
6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.
8 An appeal to the pecuniary interests of the jurors is improper. See United States v.
Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1939); cert. denied 307 U.S. 622 (1939); Buttermore v.
United States, 180 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1950); State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St. 276, 109
N.E.2d 15 (1952); Fry v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. 326, 218 P.2d 643 (1950); Pennington v.
State, 172 Tex. Crim. 40, 353 S.W.2d 451 (1962); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 9 (1953); Annot.,
33 A.L.R. 2d 442 (1954).
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This holding demonstrates that a distinction exists between improper
comment, merely violative of the rules set out above, and prejudicial com-
ment. To be prejudicial, comment must first be improper and then of suffi-
cient gravity to have adversely affected the verdict.9 If the prosecutor's
comments are improper, further considerations are then employed to de-
termine if the remark is prejudicial. Foremost amongst these considerations
is whether the prosecutor's argument is based on the evidence.
Arguments based on the evidence and any inferences reasonably to be
derived therefrom are not prohibited even if they are couched in abusive
and disparaging language. 10 If the court feels that the language or com-
ment in question is not calculated to prejudice the jury and is supported by
the evidence, the comment is deemed proper. The following case is illus-
trative:
The prosecutor described the crime as animalistic and unnatural and referred to
the defendant as an animal. Prosecutor is entitled to reflect unfavorably on a
defendant and to comment on his actions if his remarks are based on pertinent
and competent evidence."
On the other hand, where there is no evidence whatsoever to substanti-
ate the prosecutor's statements, the court is more apt to find prejudice. For
example, the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of Rogers v. State, 2 re-
versed and remanded because of the prosecutor's improper closing argu-
ment which described the defendant as being like a "slick and slimy
crow." 1 Since there was no evidence to support such an accusation, the
remark was deemed prejudicial.
The second consideration of importance is closely related to legitimate
inference from the evidence and is concerned with the personal opinion of
the prosecutor. It is improper for the prosecution to express its personal
belief in the guilt of the accused, unless it is clear that such opinion is based
9 E.g., State v. Carter, 1 Ariz. App. 57, 399 P.2d 191 (1965); People v. Johnson, 236
Cal. App. 2d 62, 45 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1965); People v. Jones, 207 Cal. App. 2d 415, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1962); People v. Laczny, 63 111. App. 2d 324, 211 N.E.2d 438 (1965); People
v. Stahl, 26 Ii. 2d 403, 186 N.E.2d 349 (1962).
10 State v. Adams, 1 Ariz. App. 153, 400 P.2d 360 (1965); Grigsby v. Commonwealth,
302 Ky. 266, 194 S.W.2d 363 (1946); Bland v. State, 166 So. 2d 728 (Ala. 1964) ("trigger
Phil"); Mathews v. State, 166 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1964) ("fence"): People v. McMahon,
254 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1953) ("filthy pervert"); People v. Stahl, supra note 9 ("killer");
People v. Elder, 25 111. 2d 612, 186 N.E.2d 27 (1962) ("animalistic"); State v. Tettamble,
394 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. 1965) ("sexual pervert"); Hayes v. State, 397 P.2d 524 (Okla.
1964) ("living in animal kingdom"); Corry v. State, 390 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1965)
("assassin").
11 People v. Elder, supra note 10, at 614-15, 186 N.E.2d at 29. Accord, Collins v. State,
180 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1965); People v. Polk, 37 Cal. Rptr. 753, 390 P.2d 641 (1964).
12 157 So. 2d 13 (Ala. 1963).
131d. at 17. Accord, People v. Meckler, 13 N.Y.2d 168, 193 N.E.2d 891 (1963); State
v. Rose, 62 Wash. 2d 309, 382 P.2d 513 (1963).
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solely on the evidence. 14 In the Woodards case, defense counsel contended
that the words of the prosecutor were improper as personal opinion not
supported by the evidence. To substantiate this point, he cited State v.
Lett, 15 wherein the Ohio Court of Appeals stated:
The vice which has been declared .. .is that the jury may understand such
opinion or belief to be based upon something which the prosecutor knows out-
side of the evidence so that he is in effect making himself a witness without
submitting to cross examination and is injecting his personal or official influence
into the case.' 6
Yet, when the Woodards case reached the Supreme Court of Ohio, the
conviction was affirmed. The court held, in accordance with the majority
of jurisdictions, that a reversal is only proper if the statements are so preju-
dicial that they adversely affect the verdict.' 7 The case of People v. Ram-
sey,' 8 decided by the California District Court of Appeals is exemplative.
"In his argument, the prosecutor in effect called the defendant a liar, im-
plied that he was an idiot, referred to him as a clod and a piece of gar-
bage." 9 However, the evidence apart from these prejudicial comments was
so strong that the improper remarks could not have adversely affected the
verdict. Consequently, the California court upheld the verdict. This brings
us to the third consideration of importance, the strength of the state's case.
If the state's evidence is strong, most misconduct by the prosecutor is
considered harmless error. Thus, in a recent decision by the Supreme Court
of New York, People v. Webb,20 the prosecutor referred to the defendant
as a bum and complained of the necessity of a trial being occasioned by the
apprehending officer's failure to shoot the defendant during pursuit. -1 The
court held that the proof of defendant's guilt was clear and convincing
under all circumstances disclosed by the record and thus such improprieties
were not material and did not affect the result or deprive the defendant of a
fair trial. The District Court of Appeals of California dealt with a similar
situation in the case of People v. Dixon.22
14Greenberg v. United States, 280 F.2d 472 (Ist Cir. 1960); People v. Warren, 175
Cal. App. 2d 233, 346 P.2d 64 (1959); Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965); People
v. Weger, 25 111. 2d 370, 185 N.E.2d 183 (1962); State v. Bilby, 194 Kan. 600, 400 P.2d
1015 (1965); Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962); State v. Feltrop,
343 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1961); Wilson v. State, 170 Neb. 494, 103 N.W.2d 258 (1960),
cert. denied 364 U.S. 887 (1960); People v. Montgomery, 252 N.Y.S.2d 194, aff'd 256
N.Y.S. 2d 942, 205 N.E. 206 (1965); State v. Cloud, 168 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1960); Lacy
v. State, 374 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1963); Young v. State, 49 Wash. 2d 66, 373 P.2d 500
(1956). Contra, McClaskey v. State, 168 Ark. 339, 270 S.W. 498 (1925); Lawler v.
Commonwealth, 182 Ky. 185, 206 S.W. 306 (1918).
15 106 Ohio App. 285 (1958). 161d. at 289. 17 Supra note 9.
18202 Cal. App. 2d 856, 21 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1962). 19 Id. at 409.
20 23 App. Div. 2d 893, 260 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1965). 21 Ibid.
2299 Cal. App. 2d 94, 221 P.2d 198 (1950).
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Appellant complains of misconduct of the district attorney in his argument to
the jury. We do not condone some of the district attorney's language which in
a close case might call for reversal, but appellant's guilt is too obvious for us to
hold that he suffered prejudice in this case. v'I
Conversely, if the state's evidence is weak, even slight misconduct may
be held prejudicial. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded
because of an improper closing argument in the case of People v. Freed-
Mail.24 "The evidence in the case at bar was highly close and highly con-
flicting. It is impossible for us to say on this record that the defendant was
not prejudiced by the argument in question and a new trial will therefore
be granted. '25
Still another consideration of importance is the nature of the crime. In
cases of a heinous or brutal nature where the evidence is overwhelming,
the courts will not reverse merely because of the prosecutor's misconduct.26
The Woodards case is illustrative of the type of case required.
The autopsy revealed lacerations of the chin, of the upper lip and left ear, frac-
ture of the left clavicle, bleeding from the area of the genitalia; cause of death
was the crushing injury of the chest in which all the ribs were fractured on both
sides. 27
With facts similar to the brutal and vicious rape-murder in Woodards,
coupled with concrete evidence to support a conviction, extreme latitude
is allowed to the prosecutor in his summation.
Perhaps the most significant consideration employed by the courts to
determine whether comment is prejudicial, is timely objection. Generally,
it is essential that the objectionable statement be called to the attention of
the trial court at the time of its occurrence.28 In the Woodards case, counsel
failed to object at the time of the alleged misconduct. This proved to be
a costly error. The prosecutor attacked defense counsel's failure to object
2.aId. at 199-200. Accord, People v. Mackey, 30 111. 2d 190, 195 N.E.2d 636 (1964).
24 4 111. 2d 414, 123 N.E.2d 317 (1954). 25Id. at 422, 123 N.E.2d at 321.
26 E.g., People v. Kendall, supra note 3; People v. Jones, 207 Cal. App. 2d 415, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1962); Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra note 3; People v. Stahl, supra note 9.
27 Brief for Appellee, p. 506, State v. ,Voodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568
(1966).
28 See United States v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 380 U.S.
944 (1965), rehearing denied 380 U.S. 989 (1965); Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d
747 (9th Cir. 1961); Flowers v. State, 269 Ala. 395, 113 So. 2d 344 (1959); Rank v. State,
373 P.2d 734 (Alaska 1962); State v. Boozer, 80 Ariz. 8, 291 P.2d 786 (1955); People v.
Williams, 187 Cal. App. 2d 355, 9 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1960); People v. Donald, 29 I11. 2d
283, 194 N.E.2d 227 (1963); Grimes v. State, 365 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1961); Commonwealth
v. Berkery, 204 Pa. Super. 319, 204 A.2d 664 (1964); Cavaness v. State, 358 P.2d 355
(\Vyo. 1961). But see Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959); People v. Moore, 9 111.
2d 224, 137 N.E.2d 246 (1956); State v. Rhoden, 243 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1951); State v.
Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953).
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arguing that "errors have been deemed to have been waived where they
have not been specifically assigned."'29 To oppose this contention, defense
counsel cited the Ohio case of State v. Morris,10 which held that if the
debasing characterizations directed towards the defendant were wholly
without support and so clearly prejudicial as to prevent a fair trial, error
may still be grounded thereon despite failure to object by the defense.31
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the misconduct in the
Woodards case was not of sufficient magnitude to fit the rule established
in the Morris case. Thus, unless the error is grossly prejudicial to the de-
fendant, counsel must object at the time of the alleged misconduct.
Basically, the decision as to whether comment is prejudicial rests within
the discretion of the trial judge. Thus, the defendant must do everything
possible to impress the court with the damaging effect of the prosecutor's
argument upon his case. Timely objection becomes almost compulsory
since the court may feel that the error could have been removed by proper
instruction to the jury. 2
Related to the necessity of timely objection is the hesitancy of the
appellate courts to reverse the decision of the lower court which heard
the allegedly prejudicial comment within the context of the whole trial
and courtroom atmosphere.3 3 If, however, defense counsel does object
and is overruled, he can at least raise his objection on appeal. Furthermore,
the fact that he was overruled can work to his advantage. The Ohio case
of State v. Muskus, a4 relied on the defendant and cited by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in the Woodards case illustrates this point. In the Muskus
case, the defense counsel objected to prejudicial remarks of the prosecutor
in his summation. The trial court overruled his objection and directed
the prosecuting attorney to proceed. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned
that the overruling and direction to proceed acted to give tacit approval
of the prejudicial statements in the prosecutor's closing argument. Conse-
quently, the verdict was reversed. The tacit approval accorded by the
trial judge prevents consideration of the element of mercy unimpaired
by prejudice with which a defendant charged with such a crime is en-
titled.3 5
Both Muskus and Woodards were capital cases. In both cases, the evi-
29 Brief for Appellee, p. 24, State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568
(1966).
30 100 Ohio App. 307, 136 N.E.2d 653, (1954). 31 Id. at 313.
3223A C.J.S. § 1117(1) (Supp. 1966). Counsel must suffer the consequences of his
own failure to make proper objection, unless prosecutor's remarks were obviously
prejudicial.
33 E.g., Orebo v. United States, supra note 28.
34 158 Ohio St. 276, 109 N.E.2d 15 (1952). 35 Id. at 284, 109 N.E.2d at 19.
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dence was strong and the defense was basically a fervent plea for mercy.
In the Muskus case, the court reversed and remanded while in the
I1oodards case, the verdict was affirmed. One crucial distinction between
the two cases is that in Woodards, defense counsel failed to make timely
objection whereas in the Muskus case, counsel objected and was over-
ruled. Had the defendant objected in the Woodards case, the similarities
between the two cases would be so great that it seems unlikely that the
same court would reverse one and not the other.
The Woodards case is demonstrative of a trend allowing greater lati-
tude to the prosecutor in his closing argument, specifically in the area of
abusive language. Where the evidence is strong and the crime of a serious
and heinous nature, the courts will not reverse merely because of an
overzealous summation by the prosecutor. Even greater latitude is allowed
where the defense counsel fails to object to the improper remark. Thus,
in a proper case, the prosecutor can employ prejudicial comment to his
advantage with little fear of reversal. He need only be willing to face pos-
sible reprimand by the court or instruction to the jury informing them
of the prejudicial nature of his comment. However, the effectiveness of
such an instruction is questionable once the comment has made an im-
pression upon the minds of the jurors.
Barry Woldman
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND
SNOW FROM COMMON SIDEWALK
The plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's apartment building, was in-
jured when he slipped and fell on a common sidewalk, controlled and
maintained by the defendant for the tenants' use. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was negligent both in allowing snow and ice to remain
on the walk and in removing it. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff
and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the judgment
holding that the landlord had a duty to use reasonable care to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice from the walkways reserved for
the common use of his tenants within a reasonable time after the snow
had ceased. Langhorne Road Apartments, Inc. v. Bisson, 207 Va. 474, 150
S.E.2d 540 (1966).
The Langhorne Road Apartments case is a significant decision in the
recently emerging law of a landlord's liability to a tenant, his guests,
and business invitees, for failure to remove snow and ice from common
walkways. The purpose of this note is to analyze and compare the under-
lying rationale of the various courts indicating the law's evolution from
placing the duty of removing snow and ice from the common premises
